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Table 1 Arab nations in the top 15 countries for global fertility
decline between the years 1975–1980 and 2005–2010.
Country Total fertility rate
a Difference Percentage
decline
1975–1980 2005–2010
Libya 7.94 2.67 –4.39 69.9
United Arab
Emirates
5.66 1.97 –3.69 65.2
Oman 8.10 2.89 –5.21 64.3
Tunisia 5.69 2.05 –3.64 63.9
Qatar 6.11 2.21 –3.90 63.8
Lebanon 4.23 1.58 –2.66 62.8
Algeria 7.18 2.72 –4.45 62.0
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, 2013 (United Nations,
2013). World Populations Prospects: the 2012 Revision. United
Nations, New York.
a Number of children born per woman.
42 MC Inhorn et al.(sperm or eggs) of a dead mother or father (Inhorn and
Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2008). As such, ART presents epistemo-
logical and ethical challenges, creating new dilemmas for
regulators and religious leaders, as well as for practitioners
and people facing infertility problems. Religious authorities
have been especially assertive in some parts of the world,
attempting to influence the contemporary understanding
and shaping of ART-created families. Even though religious
rulings can be extremely deterministic, they are sometimes
surprisingly adaptable.
In this article, we compare the various modes of ART
application, religious intervention and resultant kinship
formations in four Middle Eastern settings: the Sunni Muslim
Arab world, the Sunni Muslim but officially 'secular' country of
Turkey, Shia Muslim Iran and Jewish Israel. This four-way
comparison reveals considerable similarities, as well as stark
differences, in matters of kinship and assisted reproduction in
the Middle East. The permissions and restrictions on ART,
often determined by religious decrees, may lead to counter-
intuitive outcomes, many of which defy prevailing stereotypes
about which parts of the Middle East are more 'progressive' or
'conservative' (Gürtin et al., 2015; Inhorn, 2012). Indeed, as
ART has travelled to regions such as the Middle East, local
considerations – be they social, cultural, economic, ethical or
political – have shaped the ways in which ART treatments are
offered to, and received by, infertile couples in different parts
of the Middle East. Yet, across the region, clerics, in dialogue
with clinicians and patients, have paved the way for ART
practices that have had significant implications for Middle
Eastern kinship and family life (Inhorn, 2003).
We begin this article with an outline of the major family
features that are common to all of these Middle Eastern
settings, as well as a description of significant local diversity.
We then move on to explore how specific reproductive
technologies are applied in each setting, focusing on third-
party assisted reproduction (i.e. the use of donor sperm, donor
eggs, donor embryos or gestational surrogacy). As we will
argue, it is the use of third-party reproductive assistance –
allowed in both Israel and Iran, but disallowed in the Arab
countries and Turkey – that has highlighted and cemented
profound regional differences in attitudes towards 'biological'
versus 'social' parenthood and kinship. Indeed, in the Middle
East, as elsewhere, ART has had both reinforcing and
destabilizing impacts on the meanings of parenthood and
family life. By means of their very existence and availability,
these new technologies have expanded the limits of accept-
able kinship and family formations in some parts of the Middle
East, while re-entrenching and solidifying traditional family
structures in others. In the Sunni Muslim world in particular,
ART has re-inscribed religious and cultural mandates regarding
the primacy of biogenetic inheritance and the social sanctity
of patrilineal kinship structures.
Middle East kinship: regional similarities
and differences
From Morocco to Iran, Middle Eastern societies can be
described as family oriented, with a high value placed on
marriage and childbearing (Inhorn, 1996, 2012). Across the
Middle East, reproduction comprises a major organizing
principle, the significance of which goes well beyondindividuals’ emotional desires for children. Indeed, on a
cultural level, reproduction within marriage is deemed a
social obligation – a way to perpetuate the family lineage, as
well as a vehicle for parents to receive support in their old
age and help with family labour. Contrary to popular
stereotypes, reproduction is not the sole remit of women in
the Middle East; both Muslim and Jewish Middle Eastern men
often desire children and want to experience parenthood as
active fathers (Birenbaum-Carmeli et al., 2014; Gürtin, 2014;
Inhorn, 2012, 2014). Thus, they are often fully involved in
reproductive decision-making (Inhorn, 2017) and child
rearing. In other words, common to all of these settings is a
strong social desire for children among both men and women;
a desire that is first and foremost based on affection and love
towards children, rather than on instrumental values. Given
this, the Middle East can be described as ‘pronatalist’; in
other words, aspirations for childbearing occur at the
individual, social, religious and political levels (Inhorn,
1996; Kahn, 2000). Yet, having said this, the number of
children desired within each family has declined dramatically
over the past 40 years. As shown in Table 1, total fertility
rates in the Arab countries have plummeted since the late
1970s, from an average of more than five children per family
in most countries, to an average of two children per family
today (Eberstadt and Shah, 2012; Inhorn, 2017). In Iran, the
average annual population growth rate has fallen to 1.2%,
well below replacement level, with many young Iranians
having only one child or no children at all. However, as in
other parts of the Middle East, this has not diminished the
deep-seated values attached to reproduction and its impor-
tance per se (Tremayne and Akhondi, 2016). In Turkey,
despite the overtly pronatalist rhetoric of the government,
the total fertility rate for 2015 was 2.14, remaining just
above replacement level (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016).
In comparison, Israel continues to have one of the highest
total fertility rates in the region, with all segments of the
Israeli population (i.e. Palestinians and Jews, both secular
and orthodox) maintaining fertility rates well above replace-
ment level (i.e. more than two children per family).
In addition to positive attitudes towards childbearing,
another shared feature of these Middle Eastern settings is
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of technoscience to the control and facilitation of fertility
(Inhorn, 2003, 2012). Both Islam and Judaism valorize
scientific and medical achievements, including those that
enable married heterosexual couples to have biological
offspring. In this respect, both religions have taken a much
more positive stance towards medically assisted reproduc-
tion than either Catholicism or other Christian denomina-
tions (Inhorn et al., 2010). In fact, both Islam and Judaism
positively encourage biomedical treatment of infertility as a
means of preserving marriage and overcoming the conjugal
suffering of childlessness.
Having said this, Jewish and Muslim religious authorities
have differed considerably in their attitudes towards the use
of ART outside of marriage. Within the Middle Eastern region
as a whole, Israel is the only country in which single and
lesbian women are entitled to receive the same ART services
that are available to married women. One consequence of
this entitlement is that many single Israeli women, often
those at the end of their reproductive lifespan, decide to
conceive and raise a child even though they are not married.
Many of these women require technological assistance and
turn to ART in order to conceive. In such cases, women’s
increasing age when attempting to conceive is leading to
significant age-related female infertility problems.
Age-related female infertility is also a growing concern in
the Muslim Middle Eastern countries (Inhorn, 2015), as is
male infertility which accounts for approximately 60–90% of
all cases in some in-vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics (Inhorn,
2012). Many of these male infertility cases are severe,
involving very low sperm count, poor motility (movement) or
azoospermia (total absence of sperm in the ejaculate). Such
male infertility tends to cluster in families, with multiple
brothers, cousins and other male relatives affected (Inhorn
et al., 2009). Familial male infertility is probably genetic,
linked to the high rates of consanguineous (cousin) marriage
in the region (Inhorn, 2012).
In Islam but not in Judaism, marrying one’s blood relatives
is condoned on religious grounds. Across the Muslim Middle
East, consanguineous marriage rates range from 16 to 78% of
all marriages (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2008; Inhorn, 2012).
Patrilineal parallel cousin marriage (i.e. marriage of the son
and daughter of two brothers) is considered the ideal form.
However, consanguineousmarriagesmay occur between other
types of first cousins, as well as more distant relatives. In
general, consanguineous marriage with close relatives is
considered to be the ideal way to achieve familial solidarity,
retain the transfer of wealth and inheritance within the
family, and to ensure 'purity' within the patrilineage.
As Judaism does not abide by this preference for cousin
marriage, the rates of male infertility among Jews in Israel is
closer to the global average of 50% of all cases (Farhi and
Ben-Haroush, 2011; Sella et al., 2011). Furthermore, in the
state of Israel and within Judaism more generally, when men
or women are infertile, they are allowed to adopt, unlike the
situation inmost Muslim countries. Although adoption receives
no financial or logistical state support in Israel, it is still
undertaken by some infertile Jewish couples. Adopted
children are issued a new birth certificate that carries the
names of their adoptive parents. At 18 years of age, adopted
children may obtain information regarding their biological
parents, if theywish. However, as healthy newborns are rarelyavailable for adoption in Israel, international adoption is more
commonly undertaken, meaning that adopted children may
have no information at all regarding their biological parents.
The Islamic attitude towards adoption is quite different.
Muslim couples may foster a child (through an institution of
guardianship, called kafala). However, permanent legal
adoption as it is practised in the West is not allowed in family
law in the vast majority of Muslim countries. Adoption is
considered to be haram (religiously illicit) for a number of
reasons. Adoption is believed to blur a child’s nasab
(genealogy), which is considered unjust to the child and
creates concerns regarding future incest (between adoptees
who do not realize that they are siblings) (Inhorn, 1996, 2003,
2012; Sonbol, 1995). This injunction against adoption is also
upheld in Muslim inheritance laws that require the disburse-
ment of assets to biological heirs alone (Bargach, 2002).
Having said this, in Shia-dominant Iran, as well as in the more
secular Muslim countries of Turkey and Tunisia, adoption is
legally practised, even if it remains an unpopular and
uncommon way of creating a family. In general, negative
attitudes towards adoption across the Muslim Middle East, as
well as the dearth of children available for adoption in Israel,
mean that infertile Middle Easterners of all religions must
turn to ART to form their families.ART in the Middle East
Given strong regional pronatalism, high rates of male and
female infertility, religious and cultural prohibitions against
adoption, and the valorization of science and medicine, it is
no surprise that ART has been embraced with enthusiasm
across the Middle Eastern region. Indeed, the Middle East
hosts one of the strongest ART industries in the world, with
many countries performing among the highest number of IVF
cycles per capita (Gürtin et al., 2015; Inhorn and Patrizio,
2015; Jones et al., 2010).
Israel was the first country in the region to perform IVF,
with clinics opening in 1981, just 3 years after the birth of the
first 'test-tube baby' in England (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2000a).
Since then, Israel has become the world’s leading IVF 'capital',
performing more cycles of IVF per capita per year than any
other country (ESHRE, 2014; Israel Ministry of Health, 2013).
Virtually all forms of ART are allowed and practised in Israel.
This welcome embrace of ART has allowed married couples to
overcome their infertility, single and gay men and women to
form families, and Israel’s population to increase overall.
Moreover, in Israel, IVF and intracytoplasmic sperm injection
(ICSI) are publically funded, up to the birth of two live children
(with the woman’s current partner). The coverage applies to
all Israeli women aged 18–45 years, including single and
lesbian women (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2004). The state also
entitles women, and – to some extent – their partners, to
generous paid leave and employment protection while
undergoing IVF treatment. Not surprisingly, given this high
level of state support, Israeli women have been the world's
most active consumers of IVF and other ART for many years
(Collins, 2002; Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2016; Schenker, 2003).
Although Israel has always been at the forefront of Middle
Eastern IVF trends, the Muslim Middle East is also home to a
robust IVF industry. The Sunni-majority Arab countries of
Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were the first to open IVF
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for married couples by the Grand Shaykh of Egypt’s famous
religious university, Al Azhar. Since then, the Al Azhar fatwa
condoning IVF has been upheld by leading clerics and
religious institutions in many Middle Eastern countries. In
general, Sunni authorities view IVF and related technologies
as religiously permissible solutions to marital infertility,
provided that the treatment incorporates only the gametes
(egg and sperm) of a wife and a husband during the course of
their legal marriage. All forms of third-party assisted
reproduction – including egg donation, sperm donation,
embryo donation or surrogacy (Moosa, 2003; Serour, 2008) –
are disallowed. Thus, in the Sunni Muslim world, which
includes most Arab countries and Turkey, third-party
reproductive assistance is never practised, with this ban in
place through various religious edicts, bioethical and
professional codes of medical conduct, and legal formula-
tions. Furthermore, in Turkey, a recent law has made all
forms of third-party assistance illegal, including travel to
another country for such purposes (Gürtin, 2011).
Like its Arab neighbours, Turkey boasts a history of IVF
dating back to the late 1980s, with the first IVF baby born in
1989. As suggested above, Turkey has closely followed the
Sunni Muslim religious rulings regarding IVF, including the
prohibition of any form of third-party reproductive assistance.
However, for married infertile couples who wish to use their
own gametes, Turkey has been a generous supporter of IVF,
introducing public insurance financing in 2005 and generally
supporting the use of reproductive assistance by heterosexual
married couples through 'patriarchal pronatalist' policies
(Gürtin, 2016). In the last decade, the number of IVF clinics
has ‘mushroomed’ across the country, with Turkey now
hosting more IVF clinics (over 110) than any other nation in
the Middle East (Gürtin, 2011, 2012, 2016; Jones et al., 2010;
Urman and Yakin, 2010).
Whereas Turkey and the Arab countries now perform
thousands of cycles of IVF without any form of donor
assistance, the ban on third-party reproductive assistance is
not upheld within Shia-dominant Iran, where – during the
1990s – some senior clerical sources endorsed the practice of
third-party involvement, culminating in a final fatwa by the
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Hussein Al-Khamanei, issued in
1999, which allowed both egg and sperm donation to be used
by infertile couples (Tremayne and Inhorn, 2012). Hence, in
Iran, which is the demographic epicentre of Shia Islam, all
forms of assisted reproduction – including donation of eggs,
sperm and embryos, as well as surrogacy – are now practised.
At the same time, the use of ART is restricted to heterosexual
married couples, thereby enforcing Iran’s punishable ban on
homosexuality and conception outside of marriage.
Third-party reproduction across the
Middle East
But the question remains: why do these Middle Eastern
countries, all of which embrace ART, differ so considerably in
attitudes towards third-party reproductive assistance? Why do
Iran and Israel agree upon the use of third-party assisted
reproduction? And why does Turkey – which, despite recent
political turmoil, is usually upheld as the most 'Western' and
'secular' of the Middle Eastern Muslim nations – uphold ananti-donation stance that links it to the more 'conservative'
Arab states? These questions can be answered by turning to
both religion and culture, and to particular local variants of
'kinship thinking'. As we argue here, Sunni Islam is scripturally
and legally oriented, turning to Qur’anic mandates regarding
the importance of nasab. Shia Islam, on the other hand, places
a high premium on ijtihad (independent reasoning), which has
allowed individual clerics to permit third-party reproductive
assistance among their Shia Muslim followers. In some
instances, Sunni Muslims are also abiding by these Shia
'permissions', leading to a private world of Shia-to-Sunni
gamete donation in multisectarian settings such as Lebanon
(Inhorn, 2012). Finally, in Israel, the Jewish rabbinical world,
despite its high level of diversity, shows nearly universal
acceptance of ART, including third-party donation and
surrogacy. This has allowed Jewish infertile couples, as well
as single people and gay couples, to access a multiplicity of
forms of ART within a state that is technically Jewish, but
where both rabbis and secular medical forces have combined
to allow virtually every form of ART-assisted kinship reckoning.The Sunni Muslim preservation of nasab
To understand the prohibition against third-party reproduc-
tive assistance in the Arab countries, as well as Turkey, it is
important to examine Sunni-inspired ethical stances regarding
nasab (usually defined as 'genealogy', 'kinship', 'lineage' or, on
an individual level, one’s biological 'relations' or 'origins'). In
Sunni Islam, which is scripturally oriented, preservation of
nasab is considered a moral imperative because the impor-
tance of knowing each person’s nasab is described in numerous
passages from the Islamic scriptures, including the Qur’an and
hadith, or the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. In
other words, preservation of nasab is considered not only
ideal, but amoral imperative for the constitution of legitimate
personhood. As all Sunni Muslim societies are organized
patrilineally – with descent and inheritance, as well as
individual names and identities, figured through the father’s
side – knowledge of paternity is critical, not only for individual
men as fathers, but for the patrilineal system as a whole.
Third-party reproductive assistance is thus viewed in Sunni
Islam as destroying nasab through the 'mixing' of genealogical
relations. Third-party assisted conception of a donor child
violates the child’s rights to known parentage, which is
considered not only immoral, but also cruel and unjust to
donor children themselves. Furthermore, donor childrenwhose
nasab is unknown face the threat of potential incest as, if two
offspring of the same anonymous donor meet and marry, they
unwittingly commit incest as biological half-siblings.
Third-party reproductive assistance is also considered
tantamount to zina (adultery) in Sunni Islamic thinking.
Although third-party donation does not involve the 'touch
and gaze' of adulterous relations, it is nonetheless like
adultery by virtue of introducing the sperm of another man,
or the egg or womb of another woman, into the marital
relationship. The donor child who results from such a
forbidden mode of reproduction is considered a walad il-zina
(literally, a child of illicit sex or an out-of-wedlock bastard).
Such a donor child cannot be made legitimate through any
means, including adoption by the non-biologically related
parent.
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with adultery, incest and genealogical confusion, are consid-
ered to be haram (religiously forbidden and illegal) according
to Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. Accordingly, a religiously
inspired ban on third-party reproductive assistance is in
place in all Sunni-majority countries around the world,
including all of the Sunni Arab states. Couples who need
donor technologies in order to conceive are told that these
technologies are haram, going 'against' the religion by 'mixing'
genealogical relations (Inhorn, 2003). These moral concerns
are taken quite seriously. IVF clinics in Sunni-dominant Muslim
countries do not practise third-party assisted conception.
Although some patients may be advised to travel abroad for
such services (Gürtin, 2011; Inhorn, 2012), the majority of
infertile Sunni Muslim couples agree with, and thus abide by,
the religious mandates to preserve nasab and to avoid incest
and adultery (Inhorn, 2003, 2012).
Even in Turkey – a country whose formal commitment to
secularism dates back to the rule of Ataturk in the 1920s (Arda,
2007), and which continues to be important today – ART is
governed by a distinctly Sunni Muslim ethos. Indeed, the same
prohibitions against third-party reproduction are enshrined in
Turkish law, keeping ART within strict 'conjugal confines',
although the prohibitions are often justified with reference to
bioethical reasoning, cultural morals and a current political
atmosphere of 'patriarchal pronatalism' (Gürtin, 2012, 2016).
Under the Turkish Ministry of Health, the Assisted Reproduc-
tion Treatment Centers Directorate has restricted ART to
married heterosexual couples using their own gametes,
making it impossible for single people, those in same-sex
relationships, or those requiring donor sperm or donor eggs to
access ART (Gürtin, 2012, 2016). Moreover, in 2010, Turkey
banned its citizens from seeking donor technologies abroad,
thereby becoming the first country in the world to regulate
against 'cross-border reproductive care' or, more specifically,
the travel of its citizens seeking third-party assisted repro-
duction in other jurisdictions (Gürtin, 2011). Turkey’s highest
religious authority, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, has
supported this sweeping prohibition against third-party
reproduction, explaining that 'according to the general
principles of the religion of Islam, there is an imperative for
a legitimate child to belong, whether by sperm or egg or
womb, to a wedded husband–wife couple' [Presidency of
Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, 2006 (Gürtin’s
translation)].
This attitude does not apply, obviously, to every Turkish
man or woman, many of whom are non-religious, or who
subscribe to different schools of thought than Sunni Islam.
While it is generally true that third-party reproductive
assistance – especially the use of donor sperm – is highly
stigmatized in Turkey, there have been reports of Turkish
couples crossing borders surreptitiously to nearby Cyprus
and Greece in order to access donor gametes, particularly
donor eggs. Indeed, according to the Director of the Ministry
of Health’s Treatment Services Department, the legal ban on
reproductive travel in 2010 was introduced in response to
the growing popularity of these cross-border journeys to
access donor gametes (Gürtin, 2011).
Given Turkey’s heterogeneity, including a growing social
divide between those Turks committed to secularism and
those devoted to increasing Islamic piety in the public sphere
(White, 2002, 2014), it is difficult to gain an accurate pictureof public opinion on third-party reproductive assistance in
Turkey (Baykal et al., 2008; Isikoglu et al., 2006; Kilic et al.,
2009). The available evidence points to a diversity of opinions,
with levels of support for egg donation varying widely
(Baykal et al., 2008; Isikoglu et al., 2006; Kilic et al., 2009).
Nonetheless, in one survey, sperm donation was rejected
almost unanimously by Turkish respondents, in keeping
with the Sunni Muslim position on the necessity of known
paternity (Baykal et al., 2008). Indeed, these differential
views regarding egg versus sperm donation appear to reflect
the Sunni Muslim concern with patrilineal kinship reckoning
and the need for 'known fathers' of all children. Having said
this, Turkey is one of three Middle Eastern Muslim countries
(along with Iran and Tunisia) where adoption is allowed in the
civil legal code. Thus, some Turks are willing to consider
adoption as a way to form a family (Kilic et al., 2009).
In short, the heterogeneous views towards egg donation,
sperm donation and adoption in Turkey reveal how contem-
porary Turks, the vast majority of whom are Sunni Muslims,
are deliberating according to their own moral stances in
order to reach decisions regarding the family structure that
they find acceptable. The fact that some Turks take
positions that are not aligned with the official Sunni Islamic
positions or the secular law in the country indicates the
degree to which ideas of 'modernity' and an identification
with 'Western' values have also shaped moral discourses
surrounding kinship and family life in Turkey.Shia Muslim ijtihad – opening the path to donation
The Islamic Republic of Iran, which is the demographic
epicentre of Shia Islam, presents a quite different moral
landscape. The leading Shia jurists, who are considered
maraji (plural of marja; sources of emulation), have also
deliberated on the permissibility of third-party assisted
reproduction among their Shia followers. Like their Sunni
counterparts, Shia authorities have been concerned about
conception outside of wedlock, the impact on the nasab of
the resulting child, and the ensuing question of inheritance.
However, the Shia tradition of Islam gives precedence to
ijtihad based on the power of aql (human intellect). Thus,
through processes of ijtihad – or independent interpreta-
tions of the Islamic scriptures, including their relevance for
contemporary social life – individual Shia jurists have
reached quite dissimilar verdicts, ranging from total oppo-
sition to conditional approval to full acceptance of all forms
of third-party reproductive assistance.
Those Shia maraji who are in favour of third-party donor
technologies distinguish between nasab and parenting via
'consent' between the donor and the recipients. Through
such consent, the donor’s biological right to parenthood is
effectively transferred to the recipient parents. Moreover, in
order to ensure that no births take place out of wedlock, some
of the Shia maraji who support third-party reproductive
assistance generally extend the definition of marriage to
include 'temporary marriage' (mutca); this practice is only
legitimate in Shia Islam and is not practised by Sunni Muslims
(Haeri, 1989). Through the use of temporary marriage, egg
and sperm donors can become legitimate – albeit temporary –
spouses, by donating their gametes within the confines of
mutca marriage (Clarke, 2006, 2009; Tremayne, 2006, 2008).
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law passed in parliament. Although no law has been passed on
surrogacy, surrogacy is practised following the same rules as
those of embryo donation. As a result, Shia-dominant Iran has
become more open to third-party reproductive assistance
than any other Muslim country in the world, as well as many
Western nations (Inhorn and Tremayne, 2012).
Indeed, in Shia Islam, ijtihad has allowed each seniormarja
to form a valid opinion on third-party reproductive assistance,
creating a truly dynamic space for ART practice in Iran. Iranian
medical practitioners and infertile couples are able to choose
the particular religious opinions on third-party reproduction
that best meet their needs, without breaching any legal or
religious rules. In fact, the final endorsement of third-party
reproductive assistance by Iran’s leading cleric, Ayatollah
Khamenei, has given third-party reproductive assistance
'official' legitimacy since the late 1990s, even though ART
had been practised in all forms through the approval of other
leading Shia Islamic jurists (Clarke, 2009; Garmaroudi, 2012;
Tremayne, 2012).
Having said this, the high-ranking clerical approval of
third-party assisted reproduction in Iran has also paved the
way for some counter-intuitive outcomes. For example, in
their own efforts to maintain nasab many infertile Iranian
couples prefer to use close relatives as donors. Thus, siblings
have become the major source of gamete donation in some
Iranian IVF clinics (Garmaroudi, 2012; Tremayne, 2008,
2012), creating real potential for sibling incest and genetic
inbreeding. This preference for sibling donation must also be
understood within the context of marital and gender
relations in Iran. Relatives who are not potential marriage
partners (i.e. parents, grandparents, siblings, aunts and
uncles, children and grandchildren) are considered to be
mahram (individuals with whom one can freely associate).
Na-mahram, on the other hand, are those individuals of the
opposite sex who are potential marriage partners and with
whom sexual contact outside of marriage is forbidden. Thus,
choosing mahram relatives as gamete donors constitutes the
'safer' option – basically keeping gamete donation 'in the
family' – even though, in effect, it means breaching the
incest and adultery taboos (Tremayne, 2012).
When donors are not family members, another cultural
mechanism is invoked to create kinship ties between the
infertile mother and her donor-conceived child. In Islam, a
woman who has breastfed a baby is considered to be its
madare rezayi ('milk mother') and is recognized as being
equivalent to a biological mother in terms of kinship relations.
Applying this system of milk kinship, Iranian women who have
used donor eggs, embryos or surrogates but who can still
breastfeed the donor child are thereby able to form a
biological bond through the nurturance of their own breast
milk. In the context of third-party assisted reproduction, milk
kinship could potentially serve to mediate and enable social
parenthood of donor children, establishing a biological
connection based on milk rather than 'blood' or genes
(Al-Torki, 1980; Clarke, 2009; Khatib-Chahidi, 1982, 1992).
However, legitimizing sperm donation has proven to be
more problematic (Tremayne, 2012), with male infertility
being stigmatized within the predominantly patriarchal
Iranian culture. Regardless of the choice of sperm donor, the
process leaves the infertile husband in a very 'passive' position,
as the donor, rather than the husband, is responsible for thewife’s pregnancy. Some Iranianmen seem to feel emasculated
by this process, struggling to reconcile their sperm donation
decisions and even harming their families in the process
(Tremayne, 2012). Although the acceptance of sperm dona-
tion and other forms of third-party reproductive assistance in
Iran has been couched in the language of 'happy families', the
available evidence suggests that third-party donation has been
a mixed blessing, with biological incest and family violence as
the possible end results (Inhorn and Tremayne, 2016).
Having said this, most Shia Muslim clerics now accept the
validity of at least egg donation, which has become a popular
option for Shia Muslim couples with age-related female
infertility problems. Egg donation is now available in both
Iran and Lebanon, the latter of which is a multisectarian Arab
country with a Shia-majority population. At the time of
writing, Iran and Lebanon are the only two nations in the
Muslim Middle East where third-party reproductive assistance
is being practised (Inhorn, 2012). In fact, with the decrease in
population growth in Iran and the concerns for encouraging
larger families, the state has turned to providing facilities for
infertile couples to seek treatment. This includes the opening
of a considerable number of public infertility centres, as well
as insurance coverage designed for low-income couples
receiving treatment. Interestingly, this has led to the
commercialization of gamete donation and the flourishing of
commercial agencies, which now openly sell eggs, sperm,
embryos and surrogacy services. Even though these have not
been authorized officially, the state does not seem to have
taken any action against these commercial practices.
As in Iran, egg donation in Lebanon has become a popular
option, with egg donors consisting of close female relatives
or friends, even though anonymous egg donors, sometimes
from other countries, are also commercially employed.
Allowing egg donation in Lebanon has facilitated reproduc-
tive travel within the Arab world (Inhorn, 2012, 2015). Both
Shia and Sunni Muslims from other Arab countries are
travelling to Beirut in pursuit of donor eggs. Although most
Sunni Muslim couples realize that they are 'going against' the
tenets of their religion, they often justify this choice based
on the biological connection that will be created when an
infertile woman becomes pregnant and ultimately
breastfeeds the donor-egg-conceived child. Furthermore,
Sunni Muslim men who agree to egg donation often point out
that they are allowed, via polygyny, to marry more than one
wife. Egg donation is thus being construed as 'like' polygyny,
even if no formal temporary marriage is taking place
(because Sunni Islam does not allow temporary marriage).
The religious resistance of Sunni Muslim couples to the ban
on third-party reproductive assistance in the Arab countries is
not surprising, given that other routes to parenthood,
including gestational surrogacy and child adoption, are also
banned. Thus, some Sunni Muslim couples are taking opposi-
tional stances, accepting the benefits of donor technologies by
invoking the more 'permissive' Shia opinions and practices.
Indeed, thewillingness of someMuslimmen, both Sunni and
Shia, to overcome their wives’ infertility through egg donation
is a powerful sign of contemporary conjugal commitments. The
embrace of new forms of ART by both Muslim men and women
has gone hand in hand with the emergence of the 'companion-
ate couple' – a kinship unit that challenges stereotypical
images of patrilineal, patrilocal, patriarchal and polygynous
Middle Eastern marriages (Inhorn, 2012). Having said this, the
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sake of companionate marriage stops short of sperm donation.
In the Arabworld, the vastmajority of both Sunni and Shiamen
view sperm donation as a major violator of nasab. Sperm
donation confuses paternity and destroys kinship based on
patrilineal descent. Furthermore, among individual men,
belief in the importance of biological fatherhood remains
strong. Thus, a sperm-donor child 'won’t be my son' according
to the vast majority of Muslim men, both Sunni and Shia
(Inhorn, 2006, 2012). However, in the case of Shia Iran, there is
an emerging trend among more-educated urban infertile men
to resort to sperm donation and keep it a secret from
everybody, claiming that they are the biological father. Such
actions suggest that, for these men, being seen as 'fertile' is of
greater importance than the child being biologically theirs
(Tremayne, 2012).Israeli Jewish kinship accommodations
The same types of moral concerns about sperm and egg
donation also have resonance in Israel, even though virtually
all forms of ART are practised. The application of donor
technologies, which has stirred considerable moral debate in
the Muslim world, has never raised serious clerical objec-
tions in Israel. Unlike Muslim religious authorities, Jewish
authorities have allowed ART innovations to be incorporated
smoothly within accepted Judaic law. Having been included
in every significant ART-related policy discussion in Israel,
rabbinical authorities have been able to introduce their
requirements and modifications to ART practice, but have
invariably demonstrated openness and flexibility towards
the use of these new technologies.
The scene in Israel, however, is not trouble free. Although
lineage and descent are less crucial for most Israelis than they
are for Muslims, paternity is still the basis of one’s family name
and sense of family belonging in Israeli society. Thus, male
infertility is associated with significant social stigma. Until the
development of ICSI in the early 1990s, sperm donation was
practised informally by private gynaecologists under condi-
tions of extreme secrecy (Birenbaum-Carmeli et al., 2000a,
2000b; Carmeli and Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2000). The parents
tended never to disclose the donor conception, also keeping it
secret from the child, in order to create the appearance of a
'natural family'. This concealment of the child’s origin
accorded with state policy, which continues to view social
paternity as inferior to genetic fatherhood. Thus, unlike IVF
and ICSI cycles, donor insemination has never been publically
funded in Israel. Furthermore, for years, the Ministry of
Health’s regulations instructed doctors to maintain perma-
nent secrecy, and tomix the donor’s spermwith the husband’s
sperm whenever possible in order to create ambiguity
regarding the identity of the actual biological father
(Carmeli and Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2000; Carmeli et al.,
2001). In other words, in sharp contrast to Muslim countries
where the preservation of nasab is deemed essential, Israel
has actively encouraged a form of counterfeiting of the child’s
lineage by completely removing any trace of the donor father
and masking social fatherhood as presumably genetic.
Having said this, ultraorthodox Jews – who are not
allowed to 'waste' any sperm, including for the purpose of
semen collection in IVF clinics – make use of donor sperm ina somewhat different way. In fact, ultraorthodox couples
typically use the donor sperm of non-Jewish men because
use of such sperm bypasses the prohibition on sperm wasting
(via masturbation in semen collection), which does not apply
to non-Jewish men. Additionally, using 'foreign sperm'
removes the concern of unwitting future incest (Kahn,
2000). In recent years, ultraorthodox Jewish Israeli couples
have typically purchased donor sperm abroad via the
Internet. Single and lesbian women, who appreciate knowing
more details about potential sperm donors, also tend to
prefer international sperm banks. Once again, the Israeli
state, in support of this form of third-party reproductive
assistance, has set a fast-track procedure for individuals to
import donor sperm of their choice.
There is one instance, however, in which paternity
concerns are real and cannot be feigned. This is in the
transmission of the 'Cohen' or 'Levi' elevated ritual statuses
that are transferred patrilineally and carry ritual significance
in ultraorthodox communities. Since a son conceived by sperm
donation is not entitled to the father's Cohen or Levi label, the
birth of a donor son would expose the father’s infertility and
treatment. Apparently, the stigma of infertility and donor
insemination are so great in ultraorthodox communities that
such couples would rather forego the crucial commandment to
reproduce, unless they can ensure that sperm donation results
in the birth of a daughter. Increasingly, this is being done
through government-approved preimplantation genetic sex
selection (Hashiloni-Dolev et al., 2010), which allows such
ultraorthodox families to select female embryos alone for
conception.
In some ways, egg donation is even more problematic than
sperm donation as a form of third-party reproductive
assistance in Israel. In Judaism, it is the mother’s Jewishness
that ensures the Jewishness of the child. Egg donation, which
separates the genetic mother from the gestational mother,
thus problematizes the matrilineal inheritance of a donor
child’s Jewish identity. Most rabbis consider the womb to be
the decisive factor in the transmission of Jewishness, and
thereforeminimize the religious significance of the egg donor.
Some of these rabbis actually prefer non-Jewish egg donors,
again to remove the concern of future incest. Still, other
rabbis insist that both the womb and the egg must be those of
Jewish women in order to ensure the child’s Jewishness.
Egg donation is rare in Israel, even though it is legal. Israeli
women who require donor eggs must usually search for egg
donation in other countries. Women who endorse the stricter
religious view usually seek the eggs of Jewish women, mostly
in the USA. Yet, the high prices charged for American 'Jewish
eggs' ($30,000 to $50,000) may prevent Israeli Jewish couples
from obtaining American eggs, even in cases where they
believe in the importance of Jewish genetic origin in defining a
child’s identity (Nahman, 2006). Most Israelis, therefore, opt
for the more readily available supply of eggs from non-Jewish
donors, usually purchased in Eastern Europe (Nahman, 2011,
2013). The Israeli state, for its part, approves of both of these
modes of egg donation and accepts the resulting children as
fully Jewish Israelis.
Interestingly, surrogacy is legal in Israel, but for hetero-
sexual couples alone (Teman, 2010). Single people and gay
couples who wish to take this road to family formation need
to travel abroad. In the past few years, gay male couples in
Israel have made extensive use of overseas surrogacy options
48 MC Inhorn et al.(Farber, 2014). As in all other modes of third-party
reproduction, the child’s birth certificate records the
names of the social parents alone, and carries no sign of
the biological parents, including the egg donor and the
gestational surrogate (who may be the same woman or two
different women).
In general, these gay surrogate families instantiate many
of the general characteristics of Israeli families. The popular
attempt to have twins by surrogacy maximizes the enormous
financial investment, but also embodies the desire to have 'a
full family' rather than raising an only child. Bearing in mind
that the state funds IVF up to the birth of two live children,
the contemporary Israeli family is thought of as having at
least two children to be whole. Gay men’s efforts to found
such normative nuclear families reveals the strength of this
norm beyond heteronormative couples. Furthermore, gay
men have consistently described how the baby’s birth via
surrogacy has brought them closer to their extended
families. These non-traditional families are often actively
supported by their traditional, sometimes religious, parents
and relatives. Similar accounts have been provided by single
and lesbian mothers in Israel who have used ART to found
their own families. This intensified closeness suggests that in
family-centred Israel, becoming a parent is, in and of itself,
a 'normalizing' transition to full adult personhood.
Throughout Israel’s active ART scene, it is the parents’
desires and hopes that are the focus of attention, while the
best interests of the resulting children are secondary in most
ethical and clinical discussions. Furthermore, the presence
and acceptance of all forms of assisted reproduction and
family formations does not mean that these forms are of equal
status. IVF and ICSI using a married couple’s own gametes is
free of charge, while donor sperm,which presents no threat to
the child’s Jewish identity, is not state funded although it is
relatively inexpensive. Egg donation, a more complex tech-
nology both clinically and religiously, costs three to six times
the average Israeli monthly salary, placing this technology
beyond the reach of many couples and older single women,
whose salaries, on average, are approximately one-third lower
than men’s salaries. Finally, the most expensive ART is
gestational surrogacy, which is not funded by the Israeli
state and is not allowed for gay men within their own country.
In this respect, Israel’s generous funding of IVF and ICSI for
married infertile couples, but not for non-traditional uses of
ART, has led to a two-tiered system of reproduction and
kinship, where biologically based, heteronormative families
are definitely privileged.
Assisted reproduction and Middle East kinship:
major comparisons
It is fair to say that the globalization of ART to the Middle East
has reinforced the biogenetic element of kinship and related-
ness, even in Israel and Iran where third-party reproductive
assistance is allowed. In Israel, all forms of ART are allowed
by law, but those that perpetuate biologically related,
heteronormative family forms are the only ones actively
encouraged and funded by the state. Similarly, in Shia Iran,
all manner of ART treatment are allowed. Yet, ART services are
restricted to heteronormative couples, and such couples often
choose to approach the closest-possible, genetically relateddonors to preserve a semblance of nasab. Preservation of nasab
is also a religious and cultural mandate in the Sunni Muslim
countries, where preservation of paternity, patrilineage and
biological kinship more generally are deemed to be critical
moral imperatives. This aim for biogenetic kinship – or at least
partial biogenetic kinship through the use of ART – in all of
these countries bespeaks the inferiority of social parenthood,
and the problems that men, in particular, have in accepting
social fatherhood without true biological paternity. Having
said that, beyond this common feature, in all of the Muslim
countries compared in this analysis, ART is applied in order to
reaffirm traditional family formations, whereas in Israel, the
universal entitlement to ART effectively expands the scope of
non-traditional families, which thereby subtly erodes the
hegemony of heteronormativity.
At the same time, third-party reproductive assistance is
beginning to destabilize notions of biogenetic relatedness,
even for Muslim Middle Eastern couples, who are increasingly
turning to egg donation. Women, their husbands, their
clinicians and their clerics are increasingly invoking innova-
tive measures to make egg donation religiously and cultur-
ally acceptable. In the Muslim world, this includes new
instantiations of the ancient practice of milk kinship, as well
as temporary marriage and 'as if' polygyny. In Israel, the
religious validity of non-Jewish donor eggs has been
accepted by wide swathes of Israeli society, including many
rabbis, who have reinforced the sanctity of Jewish wombs in
conferring Jewishness to donor offspring.
What is most remarkable about many of these biotechno-
logical developments is that they have been incorporated
under a variety of political and religious systems in the Middle
East. Shia-dominant Iran is a theocracy, in which religious
officials play key roles in both government administration and
management of medical ethics. Officially, Turkey is a secular
country, but it is now governed by an openly Sunni Muslim
political party with explicitly conservative family values.
Sunni Arab countries are politically diverse, but have been
remarkably convergent in their attitudes towards ART,
including the widely enforced religious ban on third-party
assisted reproduction. Israel is one of the few formal
democracies in the region, but it is a state defined on religious
grounds as Jewish, with religious parties and authorities
concentrating considerable political power and authority.
In all of these diverse political systems, the religious
establishment plays a critical role in the reproductive medical
sector, with medical practitioners effectively educating the
religious leaders about assisted reproduction, thereby
influencing the decisions of the religious authorities. Perhaps
because of this medical influence, the prominence of religious
authority does not necessarily translate into ART conservatism.
All of these Middle Eastern settings have been quick to
endorse assisted reproduction. Whether due to the power of
pronatalism, the high prevalence of both male and female
infertility, or the ban on adoption in most Muslim countries,
each Middle Eastern setting described in this article has
developed an active, prosperous ART industry. In some cases,
such as Israel and Turkey, public funding has been provided,
leading to a major boost in local ART consumption. Further-
more, a few Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, United Arab Emirates),
as well as Iran, have provided partial public financing of ART,
either through government hospitals or some form of insurance
funding (Inhorn, 2015). In each case, these Middle Eastern
Table 2 Middle Eastern assisted reproductive technology
(ART): permissions (Y) and prohibitions (N).
Procedure Iran Arab
countries
Turkey Israel
Anonymous third-party
reproductive assistance
N N N Y
Cryopreservation of embryos Y Y Y Y
Cryopreservation of gametes Y Y Y Y
Donation of embryos Y N N Y
Donation of gametes Y N N Y
Embryo banks Y Y Y Y
Embryo couriers Y Y Y Y
Embryo transfer Y Y Y Y
Experimentation on the embryo Y N N Y
Gender selection Y N N Y
Gender selection for family
balancing
Y Y N Y
Intracytoplasmic sperm
injection
Y Y Y Y
Intrauterine insemination Y Y Y Y
In vitro fertilization Y Y Y Y
Multifetal pregnancy reduction Y Y Y Y
Gestational surrogacy Y N N N
Gestational surrogacy by a
polygynous cowife
Y N N N
Posthumous insemination Y N N Y
Preimplantation genetic
diagnosis
Y Y Y Y
Reproductive cloning N N N N
Same-sex couples using ART N N N Y
Single women using ART N N N Y
Surrogacy via IVF Y N N Y
Therapeutic stem cell cloning
(from human embryos)
Y N N Y
Adapted from: Jones, H.W., Cooke, I., Kempers, R., Brinsden, P.,
Saunders, D., 2010. International Federation of Fertility Societies:
Surveillance 2010. http://www.iffs-reproduction.org/documents/
IFFS_Surveillance_2010.pdf.
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per family, a contemporary state of affairs reflected in Table 1.
In Iran, on the other hand, infertility and its treatment
has not been a matter of national interest, and the state
itself has not played any official role in either endorsing or
rejecting ART. In Iran, ART was introduced, and subsequent-
ly developed, by the private sector, albeit with support from
some of the senior Islamic jurists. However, since 2012,
when the realities of the demographic transition and a
drastic drop in the fertility rate to below the replacement
level became apparent, the Iranian state has started taking
more interest and action in promoting the treatment of
infertility (Tremayne and Akhondi, 2016).
Table 2 provides a summary of current ART permissions and
prohibitions in the countries described and compared in this
article. As the table shows, in each setting, the state, in
conjunctionwith religious authorities, attempts to contain the
revolutionary potential of ART in oneway or another. Although
Israel is clearly the most permissive ART regime, Iran is close
behind, and both abide by the worldwide ethical ban on
human reproductive cloning, which entails the autonomous
asexual reproduction of offspring who are the genetic clones
of their parents.
Although Iran is often cast in Western media as one of the
most conservative countries of the Middle East, Table 2 shows
that its ART regime is surprisingly permissive, allowing
virtually all ART provided that the treatments are used within
the bounds of marriage. Indeed, in the Muslim world in
general, it is fair to state that both governments and religious
establishments have prioritized marriage as the most impor-
tant ART kinship form. Even in Iran, where the boundaries of
both marriage and nasab are being stretched, Shia religious
and legal forces mandate the containment of ART within
marriage, just as the Sunni establishment does in neighbouring
Arab countries and Turkey. Although Islam is popularly
conceived of as a religion that undermines conjugal bonds –
by allowing men relatively free access to polygyny and divorce
(Charrad, 2001) – marriage within Islam is held up as 'half of
the religion'. Marriage itself is also the major point of wealth
transfer between the generations (Singerman, 2007). Thus, in
general, Muslims take the call to marriage quite seriously, and
families often intervene to prevent divorce (Inhorn, 2003,
2012). Within this 'predominantly married' Middle East –
indeed, one of the 'most married' regions of the world, with
more than 90% of adults marrying at some point in their lives –
marriage is being reinforced by the presence of ART,
technologies that are truly focused on the 'couple'. Recipro-
cally, the desire of many infertile Muslim couples to 'save' their
marriages is fuelling the tremendous growth and success of the
ART sector in both Sunni- and Shia-dominant regions of the
Muslim world. Although voluntary childlessness is on the
increase in Shia Iran, where approximately 11 million young
men and women of marriageable age remain unmarried (46%
of men and 48% of women), there are currently an estimated
three million infertile couples, comprising 20% of all married
couples, who suffer from involuntary childlessness in Iran, and
thus are desperate to have children (Tremayne and Akhondi,
2016).
Even in Israel, where third-party assisted reproduction and
non-traditional family forms are subsumed within the prevail-
ing ART regime, the normative aspirations of ART-seeking
Israelis, their IVF doctors, and the rabbinical and stateauthorities who regulate these technologies are nonetheless
all highly family centred, if not 'couple' centered per se. This
'focus on the family' in Israeli assisted reproduction is
ultimately supportive of a rather conservative and pronatalist
cultural ethos, in which individuals who do not conceive their
own families are left behind. Indeed, the quest of 'non-tradi-
tional' Israeli individuals – including single and gay men and
women – for acceptance and integration into mainstream
circles does little to challenge traditional family norms.Conclusion
In short, the globalization of ART into diverse regions of the
Middle East serves as a potent reminder that kinship is of major
importance, and that new reproductive technologies with
potentially transgressive social potential often still serve to
re-inscribe fundamental principles of kinship and family life. A
Middle Eastern comparison juxtaposing Jewish versus Muslim,
Sunni versus Shia, secular versus theocratic and 'conservative'
50 MC Inhorn et al.versus 'progressive' forces also proves that many of these
dualisms require scholarly interrogation. In matters of kinship
and assisted reproduction, the convergences between coun-
tries such as Israel and Iran are more apparent than the
divergences. This finding may be counter-intuitive, but is
nonetheless helpful in deconstructing prevalent Middle Eastern
stereotypes.
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